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The paper examines the patterns of U.S. trade relationships with China and India, and 
the factors that are influencing their evolution. It also analyzes the pattern of trade in 
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Abstract 
 
The United States’ large and sustained trade deficit with Asia raises concerns in the 
United States about its competitiveness in the region. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the patterns of U.S. trade relationships with China and India, and the factors 
that are influencing their evolution. In contrast to the current public policy debate, the 
discussion largely addresses how these two economies compare as markets for U.S. 
exporters. This paper begins by noting that U.S. exports to both countries do appear 
low relative to the performance of Japan and the EU-15. We examine potential 
explanations for the weak exports from three different perspectives. First, we analyze 
the composition of U.S. exports to these economies, and consider how this mix of 
products compares to those which it appears to be competitive in exporting to the rest 
of the world. Second, we examine the role of multinational corporations in facilitating 
the trade flows between the U.S and these two economies. Finally, we employ the use 
of “gravity equations” to examine the bilateral trade patterns while controlling for a 
variety of countryspecific characteristics, such as distance. In this context, we are also 
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Trading with Asia’s Giants 
 




1.  Introduction 
 
Strong economic gains in China and India have captured an extraordinary amount of 
global attention, and the potential spread of economic prosperity to the world’s two 
largest countries is a truly momentous development.  At the same time, however, the 
United States’ large and sustained trade deficit with Asia raises concerns in the United 
States about its competitiveness in the region.  In recent years most of the focus has 
been on the bilateral trade balance with China; however, a different but equally 
contentious set of issues – centering on business services – is emerging with respect to 
U.S. trade with India.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the patterns of the U.S. 
trade relationships with China and India, and the factors that are influencing their 
evolution.  In particular, the public policy discussion has focused on imports from the 
region, while largely ignoring the role of U.S. exports.  Much of our discussion 
compares these two economies as markets for U.S. exporters. 
 
We begin with a brief review of the trade flow patterns that motivate this study.  The 
large bilateral imbalance in U.S.-China trade is well known.  While the overall 
magnitude of U.S. goods trade with India is much smaller, that bilateral trade deficit 
is also substantial in percentage terms.  Our review highlights two important aspects 
of these trade relationships.  First, despite all the focus on fears of job loss associated 
with U.S. imports from China, those imports do not stand out as particularly large 
when compared with European and Japanese imports from China.  Instead, what 
stands out is the comparatively low level of U.S. exports to both China and India.  
Second, U.S. trade data shows services trade to be even larger with China than it is 
with India.  With both countries, the bilateral services trade balance seems to be in 
balance or in slight surplus.  These findings are surprising in light of all of the 
expressed fears about outsourcing of services jobs to India.  Throughout the analysis, 
we explore U.S. trade with both India and China by contrasting it with their trade with 
the other two major industrialized economies of Japan and the EU-15.
1   
 
The main body of the paper evaluates the trade relationship from three perspectives.  
First we look at the composition of U.S. exports to the two economies. Do the 
products the U.S exports to China and India differ from the products for which it 
appears to have a comparative advantage in world markets more generally? Such a 
finding could be interpreted as suggesting the existence of various import barriers. 
How does the composition of U.S. exports compare with that of Japan and the EU-15? 
 
                                                 
*  Research for this paper was financed by a grant from the Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies. 
1  The EU-15 refers to the fifteen members of the European Union prior to its May 2004 expansion to 
25 countries. For comparative purposes, the EU-15 group corresponds more closely in income levels 
to the United States and Japan.  The expanded EU includes a number of Eastern European states with 
significantly lower income levels and limited links to the global economy.  The 15 are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.   2
Second, we look at the role of multinational corporations because of the often-cited 
link between foreign direct investment and subsequent trade flows.  Multinational 
firms are believed to focus on the creation of production and distribution networks 
that facilitate trade.  Are American business firms as actively involved in India and 
China as implied by their operations in other economies? Do they serve as sales 
agents for their own imports into these countries?  
 
Finally, we undertake a more structured analysis by estimating a set of simple 
“gravity equations.” This enables us to examine trade with India and China in the 
context of bilateral trade patterns more generally and to control for a variety of 
country characteristics including the distance between trading partners.  Perhaps the 
problem is simply that India and China are far away?  If so, this would shift the puzzle 
from why U.S. exports are so small, to why imports into the United States are so 
large. In this context, we examine patterns of services trade as well as the more 
traditional focus on goods trade.  
 
2.  Context 
 
While it is often reasonable to consider the roles of China and India together in 
evaluating the growth of trade with Asia, it is also important to recognize their 
differences.  Economically, China is a much larger country and has far greater 
interactions with the global economy.  The acceleration of economic growth began 
much earlier in China, and over the past quarter century, average incomes have risen 
well above those of India.  This gap has continued to widen in recent years, as GDP 
and trade have advanced more rapidly in China than in India.  Figure 1 shows the 
growth of income per capita in the two countries.
2   It makes clear the extent to which 
China has leaped ahead, with average income now twice that of India.  A summary of 
the sector composition of growth is provided in figure 2.  China has achieved a faster 
growth of labor productivity in each of the three major sectors of agriculture, industry 
and services, but industry stands out as the largest source of difference.  India matches 
China’s growth only in the services-producing sector.  At the same time, the two 
countries have experienced roughly equivalent gains from the reallocation of labor 
from low (agriculture) to high productivity sectors (industry and services). By 
international standards, both economies have been growing at extraordinary rates, but 
China’s growth is broader and has been sustained for a much longer period. 
 
                                                 
2 The comparison is based on the new 2005 estimates of PPP.   The new estimates reduced the level of 
GDP per capita by about 40 percent relative to the earlier estimates that were used by the World 
Bank.  While the relative income levels of the two countries were not significantly altered, the 
absolute levels of income in 1978, seem even more implausibly low.      3
Figure 1: GDP per Capita, China and India  




Source: World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators. This purchasing power 
parity measure of GDP standardizes for differences in the prices of common products 
across countries and over time. 
 
 
Figure 2: Growth in Output per Worker: Sector and  




Source: Bosworth and Collins (2006). 
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Figure 3 provides a simple overview of the historical trade performance of China and 
India.  China’s role in the global trading system has been complicated in recent years 
by a sharp shift in its global trade balance.  As shown the top panel, China’s external 
trade was a stable share of GDP throughout the 1990s, as exports and imports 
averaged about 19 and 18 percent of GDP respectively.
3   After admission to the 
WTO, both exports and imports grew rapidly, reaching 31 percent on the export side 
and 29 percent for imports in 2004.  In addition, mainland China typically generated 
small trade surpluses averaging about two percent of GDP over the period of 1990-
2004, and exceeding 3 percent only briefly in 1997-1998. 
 
Figure 3a: Mainland China’s Exports and Imports to World, 1990-2006  




Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
 
All of this changed after 2004 when the trade surplus began to grow at a rapid pace.  
The balance for mainland China increased from $32 billion in 2004 to $102 billion 
and $178 billion in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  The surplus for 2007 is projected to 
approach $300 billion.  The emergence of a large trade surplus has been a 
considerable surprise since many countries believed that they had extracted major 
concessions from China as part of the negotiations leading up to its admission to the 
WTO at the end of 2001.  Some commentators have traced the change to the 
termination of the Multifiber Arrangement at the beginning of 2005.
4  However, as 
evident in the figure, the break in the prior pattern of trade, measured as a share of 
GDP, appears to be on the import side: while exports continued their rapid growth, the 
import share has flattened out. 
 
                                                 
3 The stable trade share is itself a notable contrast to frequent assertions that China’s rapid growth has 
been driven by export-promotion policies. 
4 The opening of the market did lead to an extraordinary surge of apparel imports from China, but if 
was followed by the re-imposition of quantitative limits in mid-2005.   5
Figure 3b: India’s Exports and Imports to World, 1990-2006  
(Goods and Services Trade, percent of GDP) 
 
 
      
Source: IMF Balance of Payment Statistics 
 
India, in contrast, has long had a much lower share of trade in GDP and the rapid 
growth in trade is of a more recent origin, beginning after 2003.   In 2003-06, 
however, India’s trade grew at a more rapid rate than that of China − in excess of 30 
percent per year.  Furthermore, India has also had a consistent trade deficit, financed 
by private remittances and capital inflows. 
 
Some basic statistics covering U.S. trade with China and India in 2005 are shown in 
table 1, and contrasted with Japan and the EU-15.
5  The unusual size of the U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit with China is very evident.  However, despite the emphasis 
often placed on imports from China, the middle panel indicates that goods imports 
from China are a smaller share of GDP for the United States than in Japan, (2.2 versus 
2.4 percent).  Instead, the bilateral relationship seems unusual in the small magnitude 
of U.S. exports to China.  U.S. merchandise exports to China comprise only 0.5 
percent of GDP compared to 2.6 for Japan.  In fact, Japan has had a consistent trade 
surplus with China.  Compared with the U.S., the EU-15 also exports a larger share of 
its GDP to China, and combined with its lower share for imports, has a significantly 
smaller trade imbalance. 
 
The precise size of the bilateral trade imbalance between the United States and China 
– and to a lesser extent, China’s global trade balance – has been a subject of some 
dispute.  Issues involving differences in the measurement of bilateral trade flows have 
been extensively explored in a series of prior papers.
6  Most of the confusion is caused 
by the transshipment of goods through Hong Kong.  Not only do exporters often not 
                                                 
5 Our definition of China combines the trade data for the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao. 
6 The issues were clarified in a series of papers by Feenstra and others (1999), Fung and Lau (1996, 
2003), Fung and others (2006), and Shindler and Beckett (2005).  A recent paper by Wang and others 
(2007) uses a highly flexible algorithm to reconcile China’s trade data with all of its major trading 
partners.   6
know the true destination of such products, there is also a significant change in value 
due to the additional margins added by the Hong Kong traders.  Both the United 
States and China alter the source of imports that pass through Hong Kong if they 
judge that greater value was added prior to arrival in Hong Kong.   
 
Table 1: Trade with China and India, Major Industrial Economies, 2005 (billions 
of U.S. dollars) 
 
      United States  Japan  EU-15 
GDP     12,417 4,534 12,765 
      Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services
          
Global Trade          
 Exports  904.3 367.8  594.9 110.3  1,459.2  514.0
 Imports  1,732.5 281.6  515.2 134.3  1,581.7  454.8
 Balance  -828.3 86.2  79.7 -24.0  -122.5  59.2
         
Bilateral Trade With:         
Exports 58.2 13.4  116.0 10.5  87.8 23.7
Imports 269.1 12.1 110.0 14.2  205.0  17.7
China 
Balance -211.0 1.4  6.0 -3.7 -117.3  6.0
           
Exports 8.0 5.2 3.5 0.8  25.6 6.5
Imports 19.9 5.0  3.2 0.3  23.3  5.8
India 
Balance -11.9 0.1  0.3 0.4  2.3  0.7
            
  Percent of GDP         
Exports 0.47 0.11 2.56 0.23  0.69 0.19
Imports 2.17 0.10 2.43 0.31  1.61 0.14
China 
Balance -1.70 0.01  0.13 -0.08 -0.92  0.05
           
Exports 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.02  0.20 0.05
Imports 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.01  0.18 0.05
India 
Balance -0.10 0.00  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01
          
Global Trade          
   Goods   Services Total    GDP   
Exports 1,054.5 146.8 1,201.3      
Imports 930.8 119.4  1,050.1   2,406.6   
China 
Balance 123.8 27.4 151.2      
           
Exports 102.2 55.8 158.0      
Imports 134.7 48.0 182.7   785.5   
India 
Balance  -32.5 7.8  -24.7         
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics for goods trade, and OECD for services trade. 
 
However, both report Hong Kong as the destination for much of their own exports.  
Fung and others (2006) obtain an estimate of the U.S. bilateral merchandise trade 
deficit with China of $172 billion in 2005 compared with official estimates of $202   7
billion published by the United States and $114 billion published by China.  We avoid 
some of the problems that they identify by focusing on trade with the combination of 
China, Hong Kong, and Macao. 
 
India represents a sharp contrast to China in the small size of its goods trade.
7  
Although India’s GDP is a third that of China, its global trade is only about 12 percent 
as large while its trade with the United States is less than 10 percent as large.  Even 
more striking, Japan’s trade with India is less than 5 percent of its trade with China.  
Only in the case of the EU-15, does the relative size of the bilateral trade seem 
proportionate to the size of the two economies. For example, EU-15 exports to India 
are three times those of the United States.  Similar to China, the United States has a 
large bilateral trade deficit with India, while both Japan and the EU-15 have small 
bilateral trade surpluses.  
 
3.  Services Trade 
 
Surprisingly, China’s global trade in services is substantially larger than India’s, 
although the two countries’ service trade ratios are roughly proportionate to their 
GDPs.
8   As evident from the data shown in table 1, India’s services exports are about 
7 percent of its output, compared with 6 percent for China.  Of course, given China’s 
size, this translates into a much greater dollar value.  Thus, despite extensive media to 
the off-shoring of service jobs to India, the United States reports a larger volume of 
services trade with China than India, and a positive services trade balance with both 
countries. The EU-15 countries report services imports from both China and India that 
exceed those of the United States, but they too show a bilateral surplus.  In contrast, 
Japan’s reported services trade with India is quite trivial. 
 
Table 2 shows the composition of services trade for both countries, which is indeed 
quite different.  While computer and information related services account for nearly 
40 percent of India’s services exports, by far the largest category, these products are 
less than 2 percent of the total for China.  Other business services are the largest 
category for China and the second largest for India.  But this primarily reflects trade 
related services for China (fully one quarter of China’s services exports) versus non-
trade related services for India.  It is important to note, however, that while this latter 
category accounts for 24 percent and 9 percent of exports from India and China 
respectively, it amounts to roughly the same dollar value of trade.   In terms of 
services imports, the main differences are the much more important role for travel and 
travel-related services as well as royalties and license fees for China, and for 
transportation and other business services for India.  
 
India’s estimate of $56 billion in services exports includes $43 billion for other 
services, excluding transportation and tourism.  We would expect most of this trade to 
be with the high-income economies of the EU-15, Japan, and the United States.   
However, as shown in the middle of table 1, these countries together report services 
imports from India totaling only $11 billion.  It is difficult to discern the strong 
performance of India’s services sector from these statistics. The U.S., EU-15 and 
                                                 
7 A detailed comparison of the global trade performance of the two countries is available in Panagariya 
(2006). 
8 See Nikomborirak (2007) for a discussion of the service industries in the two countries.   8
Japan together report $44 billion in services imports from China – four times that 
from India.  This is also well below the totals reported by China (table 2), but we 
might expect China’s services trade to be somewhat more dispersed.   
 
Table 2: 2005 Services Trade by Type, India and China (billions U.S. Dollars) 
 
   Credits Debits 
   China India China India 
Total   146.8  55.8  -119.4  -48.0 
          
Transportation services  36.1  5.7  -39.1  -20.1 
          
Travel services  47.6  7.5  -35.4  -6.0 
          
Other services  63.1  42.6  -44.8  -21.8 
 Communications  1.5  2.0 -1.8 -0.7 
 Construction  2.9  1.0 -1.9 -0.7 
 Insurance  1.0  0.9 -7.9 -2.2 
 Financial  6.5  1.5 -1.6 -1.1 
 Computer  and  information  2.1 22.0 -2.1 -1.6 
  Royalties and licence fees  0.4  0.1  -6.6  -0.8 
  Other business services*  47.7  14.6  -21.9  -14.2 
       Trade related services  34.6 1.2 -12.6  -1.4 
       Other business services  13.1 13.5 -9.3 -12.8 
 Other  Services  1.0  0.5 -1.0 -0.6 
 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics *The composition of trade in other business 
services is proportionally allocated based on data from the mainland only. 
 
There are, however, major concerns about the international comparability of statistics 
on services trade. The measurement of services trade is more difficult than that of 
goods because in many cases the services transactions cannot be tied to any physical 
movement across a national border.  Instead, the transactions are defined in terms of 
the residence of the buyer and seller, but residence can be a vague and easily changed 
standard.  An additional complication arises because the United States reports services 
trade in two categories -- affiliated and unaffiliated.  Affiliate transactions refer to 
intra-firm trade between parent firms and their affiliates.  The United States does not 
report the country pattern of affiliate trade for the detailed categories of computer and 
other business services because it believes that the multinational companies cannot 
accurately account for their detailed intra-firm trade by country. 
 
In recent years, India has consistently reported a level of exports to the United States 
in the category of Business, Professional, and Technical (BPT) Services that is more 
than twenty times that recorded by the United States as an import— $8,700 million 
versus $402 million, for example, in 2003.  The General Accountability Office sent a 
team to India and issued a report in 2005 that identified most of the discrepancies.
9 To 
begin with, the U.S estimates are too low: the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports 
                                                 
9 They have authored two reports on the issue.  See United States General Accountability Office (2004) 
and (2005).    9
country-specific data only for unaffiliated trade.  Given the importance of affiliated 
trade in total BPT services, it would be reasonable to increase the U.S. estimate by a 
factor of 3 to 4.  Also, the importation of computer software that is embedded in 
imported computers is classified as part of goods trade, rather than services.   
However, because India is not a major exporter of embedded software, the different 
treatment is probably not a major contributor to the discrepancy. 
 
Issues with the Indian data account for most of the remaining discrepancy.  The 
Indian balance of payments deviates from U.S. practice in two major respects.  First, 
the earnings of Indian workers who reside in the United States are included in India’s 
service exports, but excluded in the U. S. data if they intend to stay more than one 
year.  That activity is believed to represent about 40 percent of India’s total BPT 
exports.  Second, India reports the internal sale of services to local affiliates of U.S. 
firms as part of its exports.  That is estimated to be about 30 percent of the BPT total.  
Thus, the GAO concluded that, relative to U.S. standards, the level of service exports 
to the United States was overstated, by a factor of 2 to 3 in the Indian data.
10 
 
Measuring trade in services accurately is thought to be more challenging for the 
importing country because consumers tend to be considerably more diffuse than 
producers. Since there is no counterpart to customs reports on goods, the United 
States relies heavily on surveys of service-importing firms.  In contrast to exporters, 
these are spread over a large number of industries and can be difficult to identify.  
From the Indian side, exporters are a more readily identified producer group.  At the 
present time, however, India and the OECD countries appear to be reporting very 
different concepts of services trade. 
 
4.  Composition of Goods Exports 
 
The weak performance of U.S. exports to China and India is a long-standing 
phenomenon.  The United States has had a consistent trade deficit with both countries 
dating back to the mid-1980s.  In this section, we compare the commodity 
composition of U.S. exports to both countries with the composition of U.S. exports to 
the world more generally.  Perhaps the low level of U.S. exports to these countries 
reflects differences in the types of goods the U.S. exports to each relative to the types 
of goods it exports to the world as a whole.  We also compare the composition of U.S. 
exports with those of the EU-15 and Japan as an indicator of the extent to which they 
are competitors in these markets. 
 
Measures of the correlation of commodity composition of trade with China and India 
and the world as a whole are shown at the level of 237 3-digit SITC codes in the top 
of table 3. The simple rank correlation is reported on the left, and the correlations 
based on shares of total trade are shown on the right.  First, it is notable that the 
composition of U.S. exports to China seems very similar to the composition of its 
global exports, a rank correlation coefficient of 0.84.  We obtain a matching result for 
the EU-15 countries, and the correlation is even more evident for Japan (a rank 
correlation coefficient of 0.92).  We interpret this result as implying that the Chinese 
market is about as open to industrial country exports as world markets are more 
                                                 
10 Some of the issues for computer services are discussed from the Indian perspective in Reserve Bank 
of India (2005).   10
generally.  The rank correlations are lower for India, but large differences do not 
emerge until the correlations are computed on the basis of shares of total exports. The 
large drop in the correlation for trade between the EU-15 and India compared with the 
EU-15’s trade with the world results because 30 percent of their exports to India are 
accounted for by shipments of precious stones for polishing and finishing. The 
deletion of this single commodity category would raise the correlation from 0.26 to 
0.60. This commodity group accounts for 5 percent of U.S. trade with India and zero 
for Japan.  
 
Table 3: Correlations of Bilateral Commodity Trade, 2005 
 




   China   India  China   India 
World/Country        
United States  0.84  0.77  0.78  0.69 
Japan 0.92  0.88  0.67  0.51 
EU-15 0.84  0.78  0.72  0.26 
        
Competitors        
U.S./Japan 0.74  0.71  0.61  0.27 
U.S./EU-15 0.78  0.82  0.72  0.52 
Japan/EU-15 0.78  0.81  0.72  0.15 
 
Source: United Nations Comtrade database. Correlations based on three-digit SITC 
commodity classification, with a total of 237 codes.  Commodity share is the value for each 
code divided by the relevant bilateral total. 
 
Second, the table shows that the three high-income economies export very similar 
products to China, and therefore appear to be strong competitors in that market.  The 
rank correlation between U.S. and EU-15 exports to China is 0.78, declining only 
modestly to 0.72 for the correlation of actual commodity shares. However, the 
correlations fall dramatically for shares of exports to India.  Again, this is largely due 
to the dominant role of precious stones in EU exports.  In other respects, export 
patterns accord with areas of specialization: the U.S. is strong in aircraft, computing 
and telecommunications equipment; Japan has a prominent role in motor vehicles and 
various machinery categories; and EU-15 exports other than gem stones are 
concentrated in aircraft and telecommunications. However, outside of these dominant 
areas, there is very little overlap in what these economies export to India.  
 
Overall, there is little that we find unusual about the commodity composition of U.S. 
trade with India and China.  It is similar to U.S. trade with the world more generally.  
It is also evident that the industrial economies are strongly competitive with one 
another in both markets; but the competition is more extensive in China.   
 
We conclude that the low level of U.S. exports to both China and India cannot be 
attributed to restrictions that distort the commodity pattern of trade. 
 
Finally, statistics on the commodity composition of trade can also be used to contrast 
the export performance of China and India.  Panagariya (2006) argues that the   11
composition of China’s exports has rapidly shifted toward an emphasis on labor-
intensive manufactures, while the composition of India’s exports has remained more 
haphazard.  He also points out that, at the 2-digit level of commodity trade flows, 
there is very little overlap between the exports of China and India.  We obtain much 
the same result using the more detailed 3-digit classification.  The rank correlation 
between their global exports is only 0.59 in 2005, and there is no correlation between 
the commodity share distributions. The correlations of the two countries’ global 
imports are also quite low: the rank correlation is 0.77, but the correlation of 3-digit 
commodity shares falls to 0.42.  Currently China and India are not close competitors 
in either export or import markets, and given the large differences in the size of their 
trade sectors, they occupy quite different positions in the trading system.  
 
5.  The Role of Multinational Corporations 
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) of multinational companies (MNCs) in emerging 
markets is believed to be important because it provides a beachhead from which to 
promote bilateral trade.  From this perspective, it is notable that U.S. investments in 
both China and India are very small.  Although the U.S. imports a large volume of 
goods from China, U.S. firms invested over the period of 2000-06 an average of only 
$5 billion per year, split equally between Hong Kong and Mainland China, or only 
about 3.5 percent of U.S. global FDI over the period.  Investments in India were even 
smaller, averaging $0.75 billion, or 0.5 percent of the global total.  While U.S. 
retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Mattel, have large imports from China, they do not 
deal with American multinationals in China.  Instead, a large portion of their 
purchases are from foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) that originate from other 
countries in Asia, or from Chinese contract manufacturers.  Similarly, the information 
and communication technology (ICT) trade with India appears to not pass through 
U.S. affiliates. 
 
A summary of the activities of U.S. affiliates in China and India is shown in table 4.  
The data are drawn from the benchmark surveys of U.S. multinational corporations 
that are conducted at 5-year intervals.  The top panel reports the results for China, 
and, as with the trade data, it combines the information for the mainland and Hong 




Total affiliate sales expanded at a 14 percent annual rate between 1989 and 2004, and 
the growth has been concentrated among affiliates on the mainland.  Second, affiliate 
sales are focused on the domestic market, which accounts for 60 percent of total sales 
in 2004.  Approximately 30 percent of sales are directed to other countries – largely in 
Asia – and only 12 percent are sales back to the United States.  
 
                                                 
11 Exports have also grown rapidly in recent years, 15 percent annually in the 2000-06 period.   12




   
1989 1994 1999 2004
China:          
U.S. Multinational Affiliate Sales      
  Total Sales  16,664 32,954 67,635  123,531
  Sales to the U.S.  3,554 4,638 10,405  14,297
 Local  Sales  7,438 19,289 42,565  73,602
  Sales to other foreign countries  5,672 9,027 14,665  35,632
      
U.S. Exports of Goods to Affiliates  2,261 5,719 7,533 5,402
      
U.S. Imports of Goods from Affiliates  3,071 4,021 8,500 9,719
      
Total US Trade with China*   
 Exports    12,111 20,732 25,670  50,530
 Imports    23,139 51,504 97,499  220,308
      
India:    
U.S. Multinational Affiliate Sales   
  Total Sales  323 983 4,554  13,100
  Sales to the U.S.  (D) 28 138  1,582
 Local  Sales  (D) 934 4,327  9,914
  Sales to other foreign countries  13 21 89  1,604
      
U.S. Exports of Goods to Affiliates  23 33 331 508
      
U.S. Imports of Goods from Affiliates  (D) 28 77 373
      
Total US Trade with India*   
 Exports    2,463 2,296 3,666  6,095
 Imports    3,551 5,663 9,598  16,437
 
Sources: BEA Surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, and IMF Directions of Trade 
Database. 
Notes: Data for China includes Hong Kong. Sales are those of majority-owned companies. 
“(D)” indicates that the data has been suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual 
companies. 
 
Furthermore, as shown at the bottom of the table, only 10 percent of U.S. exports to 
China pass through the affiliates, and only 5 percent of imports originate with 
affiliates.  Clearly U.S. multinationals operate in China with minimal trading links to 
their U.S. operations.  They are not directly utilizing China’s low labor costs for 
exports back to the U.S. market. 
 
Comparable data for India is reported in the bottom panel of table 4. The contrast in 
scale of the operations with that reported for China is similar to the prior analysis of 
trade flows.  U.S. affiliate sales in India in 2004 were only 10 percent of the total for   13
China.  The emphasis on the local market is even greater – 75 percent of total sales – 
primarily because of the trivial amount of sales to third countries.  Despite all of the 
discussion of the off-shoring of IT services, little of it appears to involve affiliates of 
U.S. multinationals.  
 
Table 5: Japanese Affiliate Activity in China (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
 
         2002 2003
Japan Multinational Affiliate Sales     
 Total  Sales  27,515 43,524
 Sales  to  Japan  9,506 13,062
 Local  Sales  9,665 18,497
  Sales to other foreign countries  8,349 11,772
   
Japan Exports of Goods to Affiliates  6,270 8,305
   
Japan Imports of Goods from Affiliates  3,685 5,077
   
Total Japan Trade with China 
 Exports    65,390 87,398
 Imports    63,211 76,907
 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and IMF Directions of Trade 
Database.  
Note: Data include mainland China and Hong Kong 
 
For comparison purposes, we have also compiled some data on Japanese affiliate 
operations in China that are presented in table 5. Japanese affiliate sales are 
considerably smaller than those of the United States, but they are expanding even 
more rapidly.  They are less focused on the local market (about 45 percent of sales), 
and export a larger percent of sales back to Japan. However, like U.S. firms, the 
affiliates are not used as vehicles to promote exports from Japan – sales to affiliates 
are less than 10 percent of exports to China.  In its published material, the Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry does not identify India, presumably because 
the affiliate activities are very small, commensurate with the scale of its trade. 
 
An alternative set of data from the OECD on the outstanding stock of FDI in 2005 
provides additional information on the relative involvement of the three large 
industrial economies in China and India (OECD, 2007).  The United States is the 
largest investor of the three with investments of $55 billion in China and $8.5 billion 
in India; but as noted above, they represent very small shares of its global 
investments.  The EU-15 is of similar importance with $51 billion in China and $6.5 
billion in India. Japan has a substantial investment base in China, $31 billion; but is 
very small in India, $2 billion.  
 
Branstetter and Foley (2007) conclude that affiliate activity in China is very much in 
line with U.S. operations in other countries and that it is motivated by both the size of 
the domestic market and favorable tax treatment.  We find that same emphasis on the 
domestic market in India with only a weak linkage to trade.   14
It seems clear that U.S firms operating in China and India do not serve as vehicles for 
exports, although a loose linkage seems to be a common feature of U.S. affiliates 
throughout the world.  U.S global exports to affiliates of multinationals represented 
only 5.6 percent of affiliate sales in 2004. The 4.5 percent reported for affiliates in 
China and the 4 percent in India are not appreciably different.  In comparison, 
Japanese exports to their affiliates in 2002-03 were 6 percent of sales at the global 
level and 20 percent in China. 
 
6.  The Role of Distance 
 
The simplest explanation for a low level of exports between the United States and the 
Asian economies is that they are far away.  However, distance does not provide an 
obvious explanation for the asymmetry of the U.S. trade relationship that is so evident 
for trade with China and India, small exports but large imports.  In this section, we 
use econometrics to explore its role more formally. 
 
The use of gravity equations to explain the pattern of bilateral trade flows dates back 
to the work of Jan Tinbergen in the early 1960s.  In their simplest form, the volume of 
trade between any two countries is modeled as proportionate to their economic size 
and various measures of “trade resistance.”  Measures of trade resistance have 
included distance between the two trade partners, the presence of a common language 
or membership in preferential trade associations.
12   We use the gravity model 
framework to examine the extent to which such a model can account for the 
differential importance of China trade for the United States, Japan and the EU-15. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a very simple formulation in which economic size 
is measured by the combination of a country’s population and its income per capita.  
In addition, the trade (distinguishing between imports and exports) between a country 
and its trading partners is estimated separately for the United States, Japan, and the 
EU-15.  The base regression is: 
 
 (1)  j i j j j ij X D Y POP T , 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln β β β β α + + + + = . 
 
Where Tij    = trade (imports or exports) from country i to country j, 
           POPj   = population of country j, 
 Y j    = GDP per capita of country j,  
             Dij   = distance between country i and country j, and 
   X ij  = other measures of “trade resistance”. 
 
Normally, the relationship would also include the population and income per capita of 
both country pairs, but in our analysis the relationship is estimated separately for each 
of the three base economies (the United States, Japan, and the EU-15). 
 
                                                 
12 A useful review is provided by Deardorff (1998).  Helpful recent discussions of linkages between the 
theoretical formulations and the empirical analyses are those of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), 
Feenstra (2002), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubenstein (2007). For a recent application and 
discussion the estimation issues see Coe and others (2007).   15
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The annual trade data are taken from the Direction of Trade Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund and cover the period 1980-2005.  GDP and population 
are from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  The trade data are 
scaled by the nominal dollar GDP of each of the base economies and the GDP per 
capita of the trading partners is measured in 2000 U.S. dollars.  The measures of 
distance and the other bilateral pairing variables used to proxy “trade resistance” – 
such as language, contiguity and colonial link – were obtained from the French 
Institute for Research on the International Economy (CEPII).
13  
 
The basic results are reported in table 6 and cover 162 countries over 26 years.  All of 
the equations are estimated with a fixed-effects formulation to allow for shifts in the 
constant term over each of the 26 years.
14  The number of observations varies slightly 
across the individual regressions because the few countries in each sample for which 
no trade is recorded have been dropped.  Also, while the individual countries of the 
EU-15 are included in the regressions for the United States and Japan, regressions for 
the EU-15 exclude intra-group trade.  The regression results are very consistent with 
similar estimates in the literature: the elasticity of trade with respect to the two 
measures of economic size is very close to unity and there is a strong role for 
distance. 
 
There are also significant econometric issues that we have not addressed (See 
Helpman and others (2007) for a discussion).  In our data set, which is limited to the 
trade of three large economies, we do not have a significant problem with zero 
bilateral trade entries, which have to be excluded in a logarithmic estimation.  In 
addition, the distinction between intensive and extensive trade should be important for 
us only on the import side, and we do not yet have an effective estimation method. 
                                                 
13 The distance measure is the weighted distance measure of CEPII, which reflects the bilateral distance 
between the major cities of each country. The definition of a common language that we use states 
that a language is shared if it is spoken by at least 9 percent of the population in both countries. A 
country shares a language with the EU15 if this is true for any of the 15 countries.  
14 The use of fixed-effects estimation had no significant influence on the estimated coefficients, but it 
does reduce the evident autocorrelation of the error term.   These year dummies adjust for a variety 




Table 6: Gravity Equations for Global Trade: United States, Japan, and EU-15 
 
  United States  Japan  European Union (15) 
























  (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) 
Weighted  Distance  -1.02 -0.60 -1.16 -0.71 -1.11 -1.55 -0.61 -0.65 -1.06 -0.74 -1.15 -0.79 
  (-29.2) (-11.3) (-31.9) (-13.0) (-26.0) (-24.0) (-10.7)  (-7.7)  (-48.7) (-26.3) (-43.9) (-23.3) 
Population  0.90 1.05 0.90 1.05 0.82 0.93 0.86 1.00 0.79 0.90 0.79 0.90 
  (106.0) (81.8) (108.2) (82.5)  (88.6)  (64.0)  (90.8)  (68.0)  (124.4) (110.6) (125.1) (110.7) 
GDP  per  Capita  1.06 1.15 1.05 1.14 0.98 1.13 1.01 1.18 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.90 
  (98.2) (70.6) (98.7) (70.2) (83.0) (63.2) (85.9) (67.2) (97.6) (78.3) (97.2) (77.8) 
Common  Language  0.70 0.71 0.67 0.69          0.26 0.26 0.30 0.29 
  (20.1) (13.6) (19.6) (13.2)          (8.0)  (6.4)  (9.2)  (6.9) 
Colony           0.32  0.24  0.38  0.28 
           (7.0)  (4.2)  (8.2)  (4.7) 
East  Asia  Region    0.56  0.51    0.89  1.61    0.25  0.15 
     (11.8)  (7.0)     (13.1)  (15.8)     (6.1)  (2.8) 
Constant  -37.17 -44.12 -35.97 -43.06 -33.90 -33.46 -39.39 -43.36 -32.98 -37.83 -32.28 -37.41 
  (-100.1)  (-78.9) (-95.1) (-74.7) (-72.8) (-47.1) (-63.7)  (-46.6)  (-139.6) (-124.5) (-123.4) (-110.8) 
adj_R2  0.858 0.760 0.863 0.763 0.812 0.714 0.820 0.733 0.886 0.841 0.887 0.841 
Observations  3577 3532 3577 3532 3626 3534 3626 3534 3367 3367 3367 3367 
 
Source: Estimated by authors as described in text.  All of the regressions are estimated within a fixed effects model allowing for shifts over years. All variables are 
measured as logarithms except for the categorical variables of common language, colony, and the East Asia region. T-statistics are in parentheses.   
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Of greatest relevance in the current context, the distance coefficients are very large 
and significant in all of the regressions.  Unexpectedly, there is evidence of an 
asymmetric effect on U.S. trade: the distance coefficient for U.S. exports is markedly 
greater than that for imports.  A similar, though smaller, asymmetry also exists for the 
EU-15; but the asymmetry is reversed for Japan where the coefficient on distance is 
largest in the import equation.  The coefficient on distance is interpreted by some 
researchers as a measure of global integration.  From that perspective, importers to the 
United States appear to have been considerably more successful than U.S. exporters in 
overcoming trade barriers associated with distance from the U.S. market.   
Furthermore, the reversal of the relationship for Japan implies that Japan has been 
more successful in overcoming barriers to its exports than others have been in 
overcoming barriers to their exports to Japan.  It is also notable that the effects of 
distance on exports from and especially imports to Japan are significantly larger in 
magnitude than for either the U.S. or the EU-15. 
 
Thus, the results from the gravity equations do have a major effect on our conclusions 
about the magnitude of U.S. trade with Asia.  This is particularly true for trade with 
China, which is far away from the United States (11,000 kilometers), but close to 
Japan (2,000 kilometers).  An elasticity of distance near unity implies that the U.S. 
export share in GDP would be very similar to that for Japan if the two countries’ 
distance from China were equalized.  Thus, distance can fully account for the 
differences in the importance of exports to China.  However, if the distance were 
equalized, the hypothetical level of U.S. imports from China would also increase by a 
proportionate amount.




In testing the robustness of the results, we examined a wide range of alternative 
formulations.  For example, we included categorical variables for each of the three 
major economies in the trade relationships of the others.  Canada and Mexico were 
also included directly in the U.S. equations.  While those variables were all 
significant, they had no substantial effect on the size of the other coefficients in the 
regressions, such as distance.  Furthermore, we found a more general pattern in which 
all of the East Asian economies had positive residuals, implying a larger volume of 
trade than indicated by the simple distance variable. 
 
The results with the categorical variable for East Asia are shown in a second set of 
regressions in table 6.  The East Asia coefficient is large and positive in the U.S. 
regressions, raising the predictions for both exports and imports; but surprisingly, 
there is no significant change in the coefficients for the other variables including 
distance.  Also, the magnitude of the regional effect seems to be similar for both 
imports and exports.  There is some decline, however, in the magnitude of the 
asymmetry of the coefficient on distance between the export and import equations.  A 
similar result is evident for the EU-15, although the coefficient on the Asia variable is 
only half as large.  The regression results for Japan are quite different, however, 
because the coefficient on the East Asia region is extremely large, twice the 
magnitude shown for the United States; and the coefficients on distance decline 
                                                 
15 The distance elasticity for imports from China is less than for exports, but the level of imports is 
much larger.  
16 The distance from Japan to India is 6,000 kilometers, and for the EU-15 the average distances are 
6,800 kilometers to India and 8,300 to China.  
 
18
dramatically.  It is evident that an important regional trading pattern has emerged 
within East Asia that is not well-represented in a simple focus on distance.  This 
formulation did not work, however, when we tried to expand the definition of the 
categorical variable to include South Asia. 
 
Several commentators have raised questions about the consistency of the results over 
time and the possibility that the effect of distance in particular may have declined.  As 
a partial test of the hypothesis, we refit the regression estimates to 5-year sub-periods.  
While we have not reported all of the results, the regression estimates were 
remarkably stable across the subperiods.  For the United States, the coefficients on 
population and GDP per capita had standard deviations of 5 percent or less across the 
five subperiods.  The coefficients on distance did vary over a wider range of 10 
percent, but the coefficient in the export relationship became more negative over time, 
contrary to our expectations, and the magnitude of the asymmetry between exports 
and imports increased.
17  The magnitude of coefficient changes for the EU-15 and 
Japan were very similar to the results for the United States, except there was no 
uniform pattern of change over time.   
 
 
Figure 4a:  US Exports to Selected Countries, 2005 with East Asia adjustment  





































                                                 
17 To explore whether changes in the distance coefficient over time were statistically significant, we ran 
full sample regressions that interacted distance with dummies for each five-year time period.  The 
changes were highly significant (1% level) for exports, but not significant for imports.  
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Figure 4b: US Imports from Selected Countries, 2005 with 




































Source: Computed from equations of table 5.  Values for Canada and Mexico are 
excluded from the Charts. 
 
The actual and predicted results for U.S. exports and imports in 2005, based on the 
regressions with the East Asia variable, are shown in figure 4.  Because exports to 
Canada and Mexico are so dominant, they are excluded from the figure to focus on 
exports to the other countries.  The figure highlights two important results of the 
analysis.  First, within a gravity equation framework, both exports and imports from 
China are larger than expected.  In 2005, the export relationship, shown in the top 
panel, produces a 50 percent underestimate of exports to China that is markedly less 
than the large over-estimate of trade with countries like the United Kingdom and 
Japan.  In contrast, imports from China, shown in the lower panel, exceed the 
predicted values by about 70 percent.  U.S. trade with India is so small that it is 
difficult to identify in the figure.  However, the predicted and actual values are very 
similar: the error in 2005 for exports is zero and the predicted level of imports is 
above by 5 percent. 
 
Second, the figure brings out the point that, while exports to China may be a small 
share of U.S. GDP, they are relatively substantial compared to U.S. exports to other 
countries.  The basic problem is that, except for Canada and Mexico, the United 
States has a low level of exports to all countries.  Within that framework, exports to 
China are comparable to those to Germany and the United Kingdom.  In other words, 
while U.S. exports to China are small in comparison to those of other countries, they 




Traditionally, gravity equations have been applied to bilateral trade in goods.  In 
recent years, however, the OECD has begun to publish data on the bilateral services  
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trade flows of its members.  We obtained data covering the seven years from 1999-
2005 for exports and imports of total services for the EU-15 and Japan.
18  The data for 
the United States were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and cover the 
years 1992-2006.  We applied the same gravity model, outlined in equation (1), to the 
services trade of the United States, Japan, and the EU-15 (excluding intra-EU trade).  
Those regressions are reported in table 7. 
 
Table 7: Gravity Equations for Services Trade: United States, Japan, and EU-15, 
1999-2005 
 
  United States  Japan  European Union (15)












  (2) (2) (2) (2)  (2)  (2) 
Weighted  Distance  -0.56 -0.57 -0.25 -0.32  -1.08  -0.87 
 (-14.7)  (-10.0)  (-1.9)  (-3.3)  (-20.9)  (-13.5) 
Population  0.71 0.78 0.84 0.79  0.74  0.81 
  (40.1) (29.2) (15.5) (20.2)  (40.5)  (35.2) 
GDP  per  Capita  0.90 1.01 1.11 1.19  0.77  0.78 
  (41.6) (31.2) (18.0) (26.0)  (31.1)  (25.0) 
Common Language  0.30  0.40      0.13  -0.23 
 (8.0)  (7.1)      (1.8)  (-2.6) 
Colony       0.29  0.23 
       (3.8)  (2.4) 
East  Asia  Region 0.49 0.57 1.68 1.71  0.73  0.92 
  (11.2) (8.7)  (9.5) (13.2)  (8.4)  (8.4) 
Constant  -37.37 -40.11 -45.36 -44.34  -31.19  -34.02 
  (-55.6) (-39.7) (-22.5) (-30.1)  (-62.4)  (-54.0) 
adj_R
2  0.879 0.794 0.681 0.805  0.882  0.850 
Observations  420 420 187 196  265  265 
 
Source: Estimated by authors as described in text.  All of the regressions are estimated within 
a fixed effects model allowing for shifts over years. All variables are measured in logarithms 
except for the categorical variables of common language, colony and the East Asia region. 
The data are from the OECD and cover 31 trading partners for the United States, 28 for 
Japan and 38 for the EU-15. T-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
The results are very similar to those reported for goods trade in that distance, size, and 
income per capita again have large and highly significant elasticities, and the 
regressions fit the data very well.  The coefficients on distance, however, are 
generally smaller and show more variability.  In part, that is due to the smaller sample 
sizes; but we also estimated a set of parallel regressions for goods trade that was 
restricted to the same countries and years for which we had data on services trade.  
For the United States and Japan, the distance coefficients for services trade are 
smaller than for goods trade, but they were larger for the EU.  It is notable that there is 
again a special positive effect for the East Asian economies of equal magnitude in 
                                                 
18 The data on trade in services by partner country is available at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx.  At present, disaggregated partner country data below the 
level of total services is not available.  
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both the export and import regressions.  The United States’ services trade with East 
Asia is substantially greater than would be predicted by the standard gravity equation. 
 
Figure 5a: US Service Exports to Selected Countries, 2005 with  












































Figure 5b: US Service Imports from Selected Countries, 2005 with  












































Source: Authors' calculations as in text. 
 
As with goods, we are surprised by the magnitude of the distance variable as it can 
have little to do with freight costs. In fact, we re-estimated the U.S. regressions 
excluding travel and transportation, the components one would expect to be most 
sensitive to distance related transport costs: this had no significant effect on the 
parameters.  Figure 5 shows the distribution of U.S. trade in services by partner 
country.  The largest errors for both exports and imports are an under-prediction of  
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services trade with the United Kingdom and an over-prediction for Japan.  The high 
level of trade with the United Kingdom is related to financial services because both 
countries are important global finance centers.  Trade with China and India is very 
close to predicted. 
 
7.  Effects of the U.S. Trade Deficit 
 
One interesting issue, shown in figure 4, is that U.S. exports to China and India are 
not small if the comparison is limited to U.S. trade alone.  They are small only in 
comparison with other countries’ trade.  This issue can be developed more clearly 
with the ranking of U.S. trade with partner countries shown in table 8.  While China is 
the second largest source of U.S. imports behind Canada, it is also the fourth largest 
export destination.  In the comparison with Japan and the EU-15, the striking feature 
is the small share of total U.S. exports as a share of GDP. 
 
Table 8: United States Top Trading Partners, 2005 (in billions U.S. dollars) 
 
Country Exports  Percent  Rank  Country  Imports  Percent 
          
EU-15 182  20.1    EU-15  308  17.7 
            
Canada 211  23.4  1  Canada  292  16.9 
Mexico 120  13.3  2  China  270  15.6 
China 58  6.4  3  Mexico  172  10.0 
Japan 55  6.1  4  Japan  142  8.2 
United Kingdom  39  4.3  5  Germany  87  5.0 
Germany 34  3.8  6  United  Kingdom  52  3.0 
Korea 28  3.1  7  Korea  46  2.6 
Netherlands 26  2.9  8  Venezuela,  Rep.  Bol.  35  2.0 
France 23  2.5  9  France  35  2.0 
Singapore 21  2.3  10  Malaysia  35  2.0 
            
India 8  0.9  20,  17  India  20  1.1 
            
Total 904      Total  1,733   
Trade Deficit  -828           
            
   Percent        Percent 
Country Exports  of  GDP    Country  Imports  of  GDP 
US 904  7.3    US  1,733  14.0 
Japan 595  13.1    Japan  515  11.4 
EU15 1,459  11.4    EU15  1,582  12.4 
  incl. intraEU   3,688  28.9      incl. intra EU   3,810  29.9 
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and authors' calculations. 
 
As shown in the lower part of the table, total exports are only 7.3 percent of GDP in 
2005, compared to 13.1 and 11.4 for Japan and the EU-15 respectively.  In contrast, 
the United States actually imports a slightly larger share of its GDP than either Japan 
or the EU-15.  The table shows the extent to which the comparison of the relative 
importance of exports is distorted by the large overall trade deficit of the United 
States.  Given that the overall trade deficit of the United States is equal to 90 percent  
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of total exports, the comparison of U.S. trade with most partner countries is bound to 
appear unfavorable.  
 
It is sometimes alleged that U.S. firms, provided with access to a large domestic 
market, are insufficiently interested in the development of export opportunities.
19  In 
addition, the U.S. government was criticized in past years for restricting the exports of 
those technology products for which the United States has a comparative advantage.  
As a simple exploration of this idea, we combined the data for the EU-15, Japan, and 
the United States, and fit a common gravity equation.  The basic result is shown in 
columns (1) and (3) of table 9.  As would be expected from the regressions in table 6, 
the imposition of common coefficient values for all three industrialized regions has 
little effect.  In columns (2) and (6), we added a categorical variable for the United 
States.  In essence, the U.S. performance is evaluated against a peer group composed 
of an average of the EU-15 and Japan.  The coefficient is negative and highly 
significant in the export equation but zero in the import equation.    The results are at 
least suggestive of the view that the United States is a weak exporter relative to other 
high-income economies, but that its imports are quite normal.
20  
 
We also sought to determine if we could explain some of the variations in U.S. 
performance as related to exchange rate effects.  We do not have effective exchange 
rate measures covering all of the trading partners, and in particular, we do not have a 
means of accounting for competitor effects in third markets.  However, as a partial 
measure of changes in competitive conditions over time, we included the multilateral 
real exchange rate for each of the respondent countries.   Since there is no variation 
across the partner countries, the exchange rate has to substitute for the fixed-effect 
estimation. 
 
The results are presented in columns (3) and (6).  The exchange rate elasticity is a 
negative -1.1 for exports and a positive 0.6 for imports.  This smaller effect on the 
nominal value of imports is expected, since a rise (appreciation) in the real exchange 
rate promotes a rise in the quantity of imports, that is partially offset by a decline in 
price.
  No such offset exists on the export side.
21  Strikingly, the inclusion of the 
exchange rate does not alter the size of the coefficient on the U.S. categorical variable 
however.  Evidence of relatively poor U.S. export performance persists even after 
adjustment for the exchange rate.   
 
                                                 
19 Admittedly, this is a more popular argument outside of the United States, but American multinational 
firms have also been willing to use foreign affiliates as an alternative to exports from the United 
States.  The sales of foreign affiliates less their purchases from U.S. parents, $3.9 trillion in 2005, far 
exceed the comparable measures of net sales of foreign firms in the United States, $2.3 trillion 
(Lowe, 2008). 
20 A similar point about the weakness of exports accounting for the deterioration of the U.S. trade 
balance is advanced by Baily and Lawrence (2006, pp 228-36). Using a different methodology, they 
demonstrate that the weakness cannot be attributed to lack of growth in U.S. export markets or the 
commodity composition of trade. 
21  In reality, the adjustment process would be more complex, in part because of the need to take 
account of possible limits of the pass through of exchange rate changes into export and import prices.  
See Cline (2005) and Mann (1999) for more detailed discussions.  
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Table 9: Combined Gravity Model for US, Japan, and EU-15 
 












Weighted Distance  -1.102  -1.098  -1.123  -1.020  -1.020  -1.007 
 (-61.2)  (-62.6)  (-63.4)  (-39.7)  (-39.7)  (-38.6) 
Population 0.831  0.837  0.838  0.976  0.976  0.975 
  (172.3) (178.0) (178.8) (139.5) (139.4) (139.4) 
GDP per Capita  0.973  0.974  0.972  1.062  1.062  1.063 
  (153.1) (157.4) (157.5) (116.6) (116.6) (116.6) 
Common Language  0.258  0.529  0.544  0.562  0.562  0.554 
 (10.9)  (20.7)  (21.3)  (16.7)  (15.0)  (14.7) 
Colony 0.556  0.156  0.326  0.698  0.699  0.610 
 (21.9)  (5.2)  (9.2)  (19.3)  (16.0)  (11.6) 
East Asia Region  0.400  0.407  0.414  0.755  0.755  0.751 
 (15.1)  (15.8)  (16.1)  (19.9)  (19.9)  (19.8) 
United States    -0.586  -0.609    0.000  0.012 
   (-24.2)  (-25.1)    (0.0)  (0.3) 
Log Average Exchange Rate*      -1.119      0.586 
     (-8.7)      (3.1) 
Constant -34.325  -34.249  -28.940  -38.490  -38.490  -41.276 
 (-170.8)  (-175.1)  (-45.1)  (-133.9)  (-133.8)  (-43.6) 
adj_R2 0.840  0.848  0.849  0.762  0.762  0.762 
Observations 10570  10570  10570  10433  10433  10433 
 
Source: Estimated by authors as described in text. 
Notes: All of the regressions are estimated within a fixed effects model allowing for shifts over years. All variables are measured as logarithms except for the 
categorical variables of common language, colony, the U.S., and the East Asia region. *Computed as a simple average of the prior five year trade-weighted 
real exchange rates. Data taken from JPMorgan. T-statistics are in parentheses.   
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As shown in table 8, the U.S. trade deficit is roughly equal to total exports; and if we 
projected a future adjustment that restored a trade balance, the export share would 
roughly double as a share of GDP.  If we also adopted the reasonable assumption that 
the adjustment would spread in proportionate terms across all trading partners, the 
Chinese and Indian markets would be much more important to the United States.   
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The large U.S. trade imbalance with Asia is a frequent topic of concern in the U.S. 
media and policy discussion.  There is a perception that the imbalance is somehow the 
result of unfair trade practices. The trade issues take on added importance with respect 
to U.S. economic relations with China and India who are emerging as global centers 
for manufacturing and business services respectively.  In this paper, we have argued 
that it is the low level of U.S. exports to the region, not the magnitude of imports that 
appears puzzling.  Thus, we have examined various possible explanations for the low 
exports, focusing on trade with the two economic giants, China and India, with whom 
we have particularly large trade deficits. U.S. imports from China, for example, scaled 
by U.S. GDP, are similar to those of Japan and EU-15 imports from China as a share 
of their own GDPs.  In contrast, the U.S. exports a much smaller share of its GDP to 
China than either the EU-15 or – especially – Japan.  Indeed, U.S. exports to China 
are still less than a quarter of its imports, while Japan exports more to China than it 
imports.  Even though U.S. exports to China have been growing rapidly since 2002, 
this growth is from such a small base that it would take a long time to have much 
effect on the bilateral balance.    Our analysis also highlights the importance of trade 
in services with China, which appears to significantly exceed the more publicized 
services trade with India.  
 
Our main findings are as follows.  First, the poor performance of U.S. exports of 
goods does not reflect an unusual export composition.  Like Japan and the EU-15, the 
distribution of commodities that the U.S. exports to China is quite similar to the 
basket it exports to the rest of the world.  Furthermore, with the exception of 
agricultural goods and raw materials, the mix of commodities that the U.S. exports to 
China is very similar to the exports from Japan and Europe.  Thus, the U.S. is clearly 
competing with these countries, especially in the Chinese markets for capital goods 
and electronics. We find no evidence that the composition of U.S. trade with China is 
distorted.  The situation is less clear-cut for India where the composition of U.S. 
exports is less correlated with its global trade and with the exports of the EU-15 and 
Japan. 
 
Second, small U.S. exports to China and India may be due in part to the relatively 
small presence of U.S. multinationals. Operations of these affiliates to date have 
largely focused on serving the domestic markets of both China and India, with 
relatively little trading links to their operations in the U.S.   In any case, U.S. FDI to 
both countries is now growing rapidly, though from a very small base. 
 
Third, our more formal econometric analysis using gravity equations highlights both 
expected and unexpected dimensions of the importance of distance.   Like the large 
prior literature that uses the gravity framework to explain trade flows, we find 
distance always to be a very important and significant determinant.  Since China and 
India are far away from the U.S., one would expect that controlling for distance would  
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help explain the relatively small U.S. exports to China, with the large imports 
emerging as an outlier instead. Quite surprisingly however, we find that U.S. exports 
to East Asia and imports from the region are both unexpectedly large.  Even after 
adjustment for the East Asia region, U.S. exports to and imports from China are both 
larger than expected. Trade with India is about what would be predicted, however.   
 
Finally, our most important finding is that the low level of U.S. exports is a global 
phenomenon and not one limited to trade with the Asian economies.  At present, the 
United States has a trade deficit with nearly every country of the world, and the 
imbalance with the Asian economies stands out primarily because they account for a 
large proportion of total trade.  At seven percent of GDP, U.S. exports are only about 
half the level of its imports and only half the share of GDP reported for Japan and the 
EU-15.  Most of the concerns about trade with the Asian economies would be 
resolved by an adjustment of the U.S. global trade balance.  However, we note that 
the last two decades have also been notable for the strong expansion of U.S. 
multinational firms.  Ownership-based estimates of trade, which take into account the 
net earnings of foreign affiliates, imply a significantly smaller trade imbalance for the 
United States.
22  Thus, U.S. firms have been very active and successful in the global 
economy, even though they have not done it through an emphasis on exports.   
 
It is important to stress that the relatively weak U.S. export performance we have 
identified is not a reflection of weak U.S. industrial performance overall.  In contrast, 
overall growth and gains in TFP were strong during the 1990s and early parts of this 
century, such that the U.S. played a substantial role as an engine of growth for the 
global economy.  This context makes relatively small U.S. exports all the more 
surprising.  While we do not have a fully satisfactory explanation for the pattern of 
weak export performance, we conclude by suggesting some possibilities.  J. David 
Richardson (1993) highlighted a variety of impediments to U.S. exporters.  His work 
stresses a deficiency of supporting infrastructure and lack of access to trade finance 
relative to our major competitors in global markets. Baily and Lawrence (2006) focus 
on the decline in the U.S. export share, placing much of the blame on an over-valued 
dollar.  While we too find an important role for exchange rates, our analysis does not 
suggest that this explains much of the fact that U.S. exports are relatively low.   
Finally, it is often argued that many U.S. firms display a limited interest in exporting, 
preferring to focus on a very large and expanding domestic market.  Exploring these 
possible explanations further needs to be a focus of future research. 
                                                 
22 The U.S. Bureau of Economic analysis reports an ownership-based estimate of the trade deficit in 
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